Last year, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) proposed sweeping updates to its 911 reliability and interoperability regulations. The proposed changes, under consideration by the FCC in response to the Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (FNPRM), would expand reliability requirements with an eye towards supporting the nationwide transition from legacy networks to fully Next Generation 911 (NG911) systems.

For service providers that carry, route, or process 911 traffic, these proposals expand the scope of regulatory obligations and establish additional compliance obligations.

Expanding the Definition of “Covered 911 Service Provider”

At the heart of the FCC’s proposal is an expanded definition of a “covered 911 service provider” (C9SP). A C9SP is defined under the existing rules as an entity that provides selective routing, Automatic Location Information (ALI) and/or Automatic Number Information (ANI) directly to a Public Safety Answering Point (PSAP). The FCC intends to expand the universe of entities that are C9SPs by including all companies it views as essential to NG911 delivery — not just traditional wireline operators, but also network players whose facilities directly affect the flow and reliability of IP-based 911 traffic.

Under the proposed revisions, C9SPs would now include operators of:

• Location Information Servers (LIS) and equivalent IP-based 911 location databases
• Legacy Network Gateways (LNGs) that convert time-division multiplexing (TDM) traffic into Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
• Major Transport Facilities, defined as dedicated SIP links (OC3 or higher) that carry 911 traffic across multiple originating service providers and over interstate routes
• IP Traffic Aggregation Facilities that combine and segregate 911 and non-911 IP traffic for delivery to Emergency Services IP Networks (ESInets)
• ESInet Interconnection Facilities linking separate state or regional ESInets

If adopted, these additional providers will be required to comply with the agency’s Section 9.19 reliability rules.

Revised Reliability Framework: “Reasonable Measures” and Presumptive Compliance

The FCC’s proposal would also update the benchmarks that give C9SPs some peace of mind that the steps they have taken constitute “reasonable measures” to promote 911 network reliability consistent with the FCC’s rules. These updated benchmarks are meant to reflect IP-era realities and obligate C9SPs to continue taking “reasonable measures” to ensure network reliability across three broad categories:

1. Physical Diversity – Networks must provide alternate, geographically diverse routes for critical IP paths. Automatic failover and path re-routing would be required to sustain service continuity during an outage.
2. Network Monitoring – The Commission would expand its monitoring expectations to reflect NG911 architectures, including real-time monitoring of routers, LISs, and LNGs, with physically diverse links between monitoring points and network operations centers.
3. Operational Integrity – Backup power requirements would evolve to fit IP environments, ensuring continuity of NG911 operations during power failures.

Providers following FCC-defined “best practices” in these areas would enjoy presumptive compliance, reducing the need for case-by-case engineering justifications.

Interstate Interoperability and Annual Certifications

Perhaps the most significant – and contentious – step toward national uniformity is the FCC’s proposed interstate interoperability requirement for ESInet interconnection facilities. Under the draft rules, C9SPs responsible for interstate routing would need to:

• Conduct annual conformance and interoperability testing with at least two ESInets in other states (or document equivalent alternative measures).
• Certify annually that their equipment conforms to “commonly accepted standards” for NG911 interoperability.
• Demonstrate the ability to process and share interstate 911 requests — including voice, text, and video — consistently and without data loss.

This proposal received a significant amount of criticism and opposition during the comment cycle. Many commenters argued it was premature to implement interoperability requirements and cautioned that such an approach would stifle innovation and hamper the ongoing NG911 rollout.  

Expanded Oversight and Direct 911 Authority Access

The FCC also seeks to bolster transparency and state-level oversight of reliability data. Key proposed changes include:

• Requiring C9SPs to submit updated reliability and interoperability certifications that specify which facility types (legacy or NG911) they operate.
• Granting 911 Authorities direct access to these certifications — either through the FCC’s database or upon request to the provider — mirroring the agency’s Network Outage Reporting System (NORS) access framework.
• Mandating notification to both the FCC and relevant 911 Authorities when a provider ceases 911 service.

For providers, this means enhanced state visibility into network reliability practices — and potential opportunities to informally audit and follow up with providers if there are concerns about network reliability.

Enforcement and Petition Process

To reinforce compliance without resorting immediately to formal enforcement, the FCC proposes a structured remedial process:

1. If the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau identifies apparent reliability or interoperability deficiencies, it may issue a notice of deficiency proposing corrective actions.
2. C9SPs would have 30 days to respond, providing explanations, disputing the notice, or suggesting alternative measures that can be taken to resolve the issue.
3. The Bureau could then issue a corrective order setting deadlines and requiring documentation of remedial actions.
4. State and local 911 Authorities would be empowered to petition the Bureau if they believe a C9SP has filed inaccurate certifications or failed to maintain reasonable network practices.

This codified escalation path represents a more expedited compliance development — providing both the FCC and state agencies with new tools to proactively address real or perceived 911 reliability issues before public safety is compromised.

Implications for Covered 911 Service Providers

The Comment cycle was completed nearly a year ago, and we expect the FCC to issue new rules in late summer that track the initial proposal with some important deviations, particularly around interoperability. Entities in the NG911 ecosystem – even those that currently are not considered C9SPs – should continue to monitor this closely. New categories of providers could be swept up in this expanded definition of a C9SP and, in short order, would be required to develop procedures to ensure they have taken the required steps to provide network reliability to satisfy the annual certification obligations. All C9SPs – under the current definition and potentially expanded definition – should also prepare for direct inquiries from state and local 911 Authorities if the FCC adopts its new petition process.